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Abstract 
 
Recently, the mobile industry has experienced an 
extreme increment in number of its users. The GSM 
network with the greatest worldwide number of users 
succumbs to several security vulnerabilities. Although 
some of its security problems are addressed in its 
upper generations, there are still many operators 
using 2G systems. This paper briefly presents the most 
important security flaws of the GSM network and its 
transport channels. It also provides some practical 
solutions to improve the security of currently available 
2G systems.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Mobile communications has experienced a great 
acceptance among the human societies. It has 
influenced and revolutionized different aspects of the 
human life. With a mobile handset, anyone can be 
accessed anywhere. At the beginning of 2007, the 
worldwide number of mobile users reached to 2.83 
billion people where 2.28 billion users out of them (i.e. 
80.5%) were using the Global Service for Mobile 
communications (GSM) [1]. The GSM system and its 
building blocks are depicted in Figure 1. The GSM has 
experienced gradual improvements that leaded to 
several versions such as GSM1800, HSCSD (High 
Speed Circuit Switched Data), EDGE (Enhanced Data 
rates for GSM Evolution), and GPRS (General Packet 
Radio Service). The GSM improvements are continued 
to 3G systems such as UMTS. It is believed that the 
GSM has many inherent security flaws and some of its 
security flaws are addressed in the upper generations 
such as UMTS. However, many operators especially in 
the developing countries are still using the traditional 
GSM network that succumbs to several security flaws. 
 Although the GSM security is considered in some 
literatures [2-4], they did not present a complete 
security evaluation or even propose solutions. This 
paper provides a brief and complete review of the 
GSM security flaws, and some applicable solutions to 
improve the security of currently available GSM 
systems. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
briefly introduces the security attributes of the GSM. 
Section 3 challenges the GSM security. The security of 
GSM transport channels is briefly described in section 
4. Section 5 provides some practical solutions to 
improve the security of GSM, and section 6 gives the 
conclusions. 
 
 
Figure 1. GSM Architecture 
 
2. Security Architecture of the GSM 
 
The security architecture of GSM was originally 
intended to provide security services such as 
anonymity, authentication, and confidentiality of user 
data and signaling information [5]. The security goals 
of GSM are as follows: 
 Authentication of mobile users for the network, 
 Confidentiality of user data and signaling 
information, 
 Anonymity of subscriber's identity, 
 Using SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) as a 
security module. 
 
 The Mobile Station (MS) consists of the Mobile 
Equipment (ME), and the SIM card. The SIM is a 
cryptographic smart card with the GSM specific 
applications loaded onto it. As a smart card, it has 
some inherent security functions specified to smart 
cards [6]. Its operating system and chip hardware have 
several security attributes. SIM includes all the 
necessary information to access the subscriber's 
account. IMSI and Ki are stored on every SIM. IMSI is 
the International Mobile Subscriber Identity with at 
most 15 digits uniquely devoted to every mobile 
subscriber in the world. Ki (Individual subscriber 
authentication Key) is a random 128-bits number that 
is the root cryptographic key used for generating 
session keys, and authenticating the mobile users to the 
network. Ki is strictly protected and is stored on the 
subscriber's SIM, and AuC. The SIM is itself protected 
by an optional Personal Identification Number (PIN). 
Each user is requested to enter the PIN unless this 
feature is deactivated by the user. After a number of 
invalid attempts that is usually 3 times, the SIM locks 
out the PIN, and the PUK (PIN UnlocK) is then 
requested. If the PUK is also incorrectly entered for a 
number of times that is usually 10 times, the SIM 
refuses local accesses to its privileged information and 
authentication functions, and makes itself useless.  
 Authentication and confidentiality of user data are 
in deposit of the secrecy of IMSI and Ki. With 
disclosure of such numbers, anyone can impersonate a 
legitimate user. A3 and A8 algorithms are also 
implemented on every SIM. This means that each 
operator can determine and change such algorithms 
independent of other operators and hardware 
manufacturers. Therefore, the authentication will work 
when a user is roaming on other countries or operators 
since the local network will query the HLR of the 
home network for the results and does not need to 
know the A3/A8 algorithm of the home network. A3 is 
mainly used for authenticating users to the network 
while A8 is used for generating the session key of 
encryption Kc. The network sends a random challenge 
to the user so that SIM produces Kc and SRES. After 
user authentication, the network can order the phone to 
start the encryption by using the generated session key 
Kc.  
 The cryptographic algorithms are implemented on 
the hardware of mobile phones. The network can 
choose from up to 7 different encryption algorithms (or 
the mode of no ciphering) but it should choose an 
algorithm that is implemented on the phones. A class-
mark message has been earlier specified the phone's 
capabilities to the network. Three algorithms are 
generally available: A5/1, A5/2, and A5/3. A5/1 and 
A5/2 are two stream ciphers originally defined by the 
GSM standards. A5/1 is stronger but it is subject to 
export control and can be used by those countries that 
are members of CEPT. A5/2 is deliberately weakened 
to be deployed by the other countries. The use of such 
algorithms is controlled by the GSM Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU). A5/3 is a block cipher based on 
the Kasumi algorithm that is defined by the 3GPP at 
2002 and can be supported on dual-mode phones that 
are capable of working on both 2G and 3G systems. 
The GSM authentication, session key generation, and 
encryption processes are depicted in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. GSM Authentication, Session key 
generation, and Ciphering 
 
 The anonymity in the GSM is provided by replacing 
the use of IMSI with a 32-bit Temporarily Mobile 
Subscriber Identity (TMSI). TMSI is typically handled 
by the VLR, is valid in a particular Location Area 
(LA), and will be updated at least in every location 
update procedure. It is also stored on the subscriber's 
SIM and prevents an eavesdropper to track a particular 
subscriber. 
 
3. Challenges to the GSM Security 
 
The openness of wireless communications makes the 
communicating parties more vulnerable to the security 
threats. Although GSM tried to harden the interception 
by using several techniques such as frequency 
hopping, the real-time interception of the exchanged 
information is completely practical [7]. Currently, 
there are commercial equipments capable of 
simultaneously intercepting several collocated 
subscribers [8]. While GSM was intended to be a 
secure wireless system and considered the user 
authentication and over-the-air encryption, it is 
completely vulnerable to several attacks, each of them 
aiming a part of network. Hereunder, the most 
important security flaws of the GSM are briefly listed. 
Several practical scenarios can also be deployed to 
misuse such vulnerabilities that are neglected for the 
case of brevity.  
 
1) Unilateral authentication and vulnerability to the 
man-in-the-middle attack: This is the network that 
authenticates users. The user does not authenticate 
network so the attacker can use a false BTS with the 
same mobile network code as the subscriber's 
legitimate network to impersonate himself and perform 
a man-in-the-middle attack. The attacker can then 
perform several scenarios to modify or fabricate the 
exchanged data. At the designing phase of the GSM 
protocols, this kind of attack seemed impractical due to 
costly required equipments. Currently, this kind of 
attack is completely applicable due to the decreased 
costs. 
 
2) Flaws in implementation of A3/A8 algorithms: 
Although the GSM architecture allows operator to 
choose any algorithm for A3 and A8, many operators 
used COMP128 (or COMP128-1) that was secretly 
developed by the GSM association. The structure of 
COMP128 was finally discovered by reverse 
engineering and some revealed documentations, and 
many security flaws were subsequently discovered. In 
addition to the fact that COMP128 makes revealing Ki 
possible especially when specific challenges are 
introduced, it deliberately sets ten rightmost bits of Kc 
equal to zero that makes the deployed cryptographic 
algorithms 1024 times weaker and more vulnerable, 
due to the decreased keyspace. Some GSM network 
operators tried another new algorithm for the A3/A8, 
called COMP128-2. COMP128-2 was also secretly 
designed and inherited the problem of decreased 
keyspace. Despite of such important problem, no other 
problems are reported so far. However, we can 
prospect for new discovered vulnerabilities in the 
future as it is secretly designed. An improved version 
of COMP128-2, called COM128-3, is also proposed 
that generates 64 bits of session key and resolves the 
problem of decreased keyspace. 
 
3) SIM card cloning: Another important challenge is 
to derive the root key Ki from the subscriber's SIM. In 
April 1998, the Smartcard Developer Association 
(SDA) and the ISAAC research group could find an 
important vulnerability in the COMP128 algorithm 
that helped them to extract Ki in eight hours by 
sending many challenges to the SIM. Subsequently, 
some other schemes were proposed that were based on 
the chosen challenges and were capable of extracting 
Ki in fewer times. Ultimately, a side-channel attack, 
called partitioning attack, was proposed by the IBM 
researchers that makes attacker capable of extracting 
Ki if he could access the subscriber's SIM just for one 
minute [9]. The attacker can then clone the SIM and 
use it for his fraudulent purposes. The COMP128 
algorithm needs large lookup tables that would leak 
some important information via the side channels when 
it is implemented on a small SIM. 
 
4) Over-the-air cracking: It is feasible to misuse the 
vulnerability of COMP128 for extracting the Ki of the 
target user without any physical access to the SIM. 
This can be accomplished by sending several 
challenges over the air to the SIM and analyzing the 
responses. However, this approach may take several 
hours. The attacker can also extract IMSI using an 
approach that will be explained later. After finding Ki 
and IMSI of the target subscriber, the attacker can 
clone the SIM and make and receive calls and other 
services such as SMS in the name of the victim 
subscriber. However, the attacker will encounter with a 
slight problem. The GSM network allows only one 
SIM to access to the network at any given time so if 
the attacker and the victim subscriber try to access 
from different locations, the network will realize 
existence of duplicated cards and disables the affected 
account. 
 
5) Flaws in cryptographic algorithms: Both A5/1 
and A5/2 algorithms were developed in secret. The 
output of A5/1 is the XOR of three LFSRs. An 
efficient attack to A5/1 that can be used for a real-time 
cryptanalysis on a PC includes two kinds of attacks 
[10]: The former that requires the first two minutes of 
eavesdropped encrypted conversation is capable of 
extracting the ciphering key in about one second, while 
the latter just needs two seconds of encrypted 
conversation to extract the ciphering key in several 
minutes. A5/2 is the deliberately weakened variant of 
A5/1. An efficient attack to A5/2 requires less than one 
second of encrypted conversation to extract the 
ciphering key in less than one second on a PC [11]. 
 
6) Short range of protection: The encryption is only 
accomplished over the airway path between MS and 
BTS. There is not any protection over other parts of 
network and the information is clearly sent over the 
fixed parts. This is a major exposure for the GSM, 
especially when the communication between BTS and 
BSC is performed over the wireless links that have 
potential vulnerabilities for interception. In some 
countries, the encryption facility of the air interface is 
not activated at all. There are also security problems on 
the GSM backbone. The deployed Signaling System 
no.7 (SS7) has also several security vulnerabilities. 
The messages in the current SS7 system is so that they 
can be modifies or even fabricated into the global SS7 
system in an uncontrolled manner [12]. SS7 
incorporates very limited authentication procedures 
since it was originally designed for the closed 
telecommunication communities. The interconnection 
with Internet can also have its potential vulnerabilities. 
Additional vulnerabilities will be arisen when SS7 
systems are interconnected using the Internet. Remote 
management of the GSM backbone elements that can 
be conducted by connecting them to the IP networks 
can also introduce additional vulnerabilities. If the 
HLR and AuC are physically separated, it can be a 
new point of vulnerability since the authentication 
triplets may be obtained from AuC by masquerading as 
another system entity, e.g. a HLR. Unauthorized 
accesses to HLR, AuC, and MSC will also cause 
several problems. 
 
7) Lack of user visibility: The ciphering is controlled 
by the BTS. The user is not alerted when the ciphering 
mode is deactivated. A false BTS can also deactivate 
the ciphering mode and force MS to send data in an 
unencrypted manner. 
 
8) Leaking the user anonymity: Whenever a 
subscriber enters a location area for the first time or 
when the mapping table between the subscriber's 
TMSI and IMSI is lost, the network requests the 
subscriber to clearly declare the IMSI. This can be 
misused to fail the user's anonymity and can be 
accomplished by sending an IDENTITY REQUEST 
command from a false BTS to the MS of the target 
user to find the corresponding IMSI.  
 
9) Vulnerability to the DoS attack: A single attacker 
is capable of disabling an entire GSM cell via a Denial 
of Service (DoS) attack. The attacker can send the 
CHANNEL REQUEST message to the BSC for 
several times but he/she does not complete the protocol 
and requests another signaling channel. Since the 
number of signaling channels is limited, this leads to a 
DoS attack. It is feasible since the call setup protocol 
performs the resource allocations without adequate 
authentication. This attack is economical since it does 
not have any charge for the attacker. It can also be 
used for many practical situations such as terrorist 
attacks [13].  
 
10) Absence of integrity protection: Although the 
GSM security architecture considers authentication and 
confidentiality, there is no provision for any integrity 
protection of information [2]. Therefore, the recipient 
cannot verify that a certain message was not tampered 
with.  
 
11) Vulnerability to replay attacks: The attacker can 
misuse the previously exchanged messages between 
the subscriber and network in order to perform the 
replay attacks. 
 
12) Increased redundancy due to the coding 
preference: The Forward Error Correcting (FEC) is 
performed prior to the ciphering so there is a 
redundancy that increases the security vulnerabilities 
of deployed cryptographic algorithms. 
4. Security of Transport Channels 
 
The GSM network has some transport channels: Short 
Message Service (SMS), Unstructured Supplementary 
Service Data (USSD), Wireless Application Protocol 
(WAP), and the voice channel. There are also some 
newer services such as Enhanced Messaging Service 
(EMS) and Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) that 
have been added in the GSM upgrades. The security 
flaws described in the previous section are commonly 
applicable to all the services and transport channels 
since they aim all the exchanged data and signaling 
information. However, in addition to such common 
flaws, some of GSM transport channels have some 
extra problems and vulnerabilities. The SMS 
messaging has some extra security vulnerabilities due 
to its store-and-forward attribute, and the problem of 
fake SMS that can be conducted via the Internet. When 
a user is roaming, the SMS content passes through 
different networks and perhaps the Internet that 
exposes it to various vulnerabilities and attacks. 
Another concern is arisen when an adversary gets 
access to the phone and reads the previous unprotected 
messages. The USSD that is a session-oriented 
technology is also vulnerable to attacks since the 
messages are not encrypted and secured on the GSM 
backbone.  
 The WAP allows ME to connect to the Internet. The 
WAP Gateway that resides between MS and Web 
server in the WAP architecture and acts as an 
interpreter between the Internet protocols (HTTP, 
SSL/TLS, and UDP/TCP/IP) and the corresponding 
WAP protocols (WSP/WTP, WTLS, and WDP), 
introduces an additional security flaw in some 
implementations that is referred to as the WAP gap. 
Other concerns are arisen from security problems of 
the Internet as a huge uncontrolled network that is in 
contradiction with assumptions of the GSM security 
architecture in which the core network is assumed as a 
secure and controlled environment. The web servers 
may also download and execute malicious applets at 
the client (ME) so the safety of applets and other 
downloaded programs is another concern. 
 
5. Solutions to the GSM Security Flaws 
 
The GSM specifications have been revolutionized 
during times. In 2002, several efforts have been done 
to design new cryptographic algorithms for GSM, 
ECSD, GPRS, and EGPRS that can be implemented on 
dual-mode phones. Ultimately, A5/3 for GSM and 
ECSD/EDGE, GEA3 for GPRS, and f8 for UMTS 
were proposed, all of them having a similar structure. 
The security mechanisms of the GPRS are similar to 
that of the GSM. However, instead of using A5 
algorithm, GPRS uses the GPRS Encryption Algorithm 
(GEA) that currently has three versions: GEA1, GEA2, 
and GEA3. In the GPRS, the end terminal of 
encryption is moved towards a deeper point in the 
network, i.e. the SGSN. Although the encryption is 
performed at the physical layer of the GSM, it is 
accomplished at the Logical Link Control (LLL) layer 
of the GPRS. The UMTS, in addition to its new 
offered applications, has scrutinized the GSM security 
problems and has resolved most of them. The main 
reason of GSM security problems was due to the fact 
that its security was provided by obscurity so the 
UMTS algorithms were openly designed. 
Consequently, its algorithms are not encountered with 
serious problems. Although some theoretical attacks 
are proposed, they are not practically feasible with the 
current technology. However, there are also some 
other problems related to the deployed protocols. 
 Regardless of security improvements in the upper 
generation networks, it is necessary to provide 
solutions to improve the security of the currently 
available 2G systems. Hereunder, some practical 
solutions are proposed for this purpose. 
 
1) Using secure algorithms for A3/A8 
implementations: This can thwart the dangerous SIM 
card cloning attack. This solution is profitable since 
the network operators can perform such improvement 
themselves and without any need to the software and 
hardware manufacturers or the GSM consortium. 
However, this solution requires providing and 
distributing new SIM cards and modifying the 
software of the HLR. Currently, both COMP128-2 and 
COMP128-3 algorithms thwart the SIM card cloning 
and over-the-air cracking of Ki. Since COMP128-3 
enhances the effective key length of the session key to 
further 10 bits, it allows the deployed cryptographic 
algorithm to have its nominal security. Although it is 
soon to judge on the real security of COMP128-2 and 
COMP128-3, they have apparent advantages over the 
traditional COMP128-1 that its SIM cloning apparatus 
are available at very low prices. 
 
2) Using secure ciphering algorithms: Operators can 
use newer and more secure algorithms such as A5/3 
provided that such improvements are allowed by the 
GSM consortium. The deployed cryptographic 
algorithms should be implemented on both BTS and 
mobile phones. Any change to the cryptographic 
algorithms requires agreement and cooperation of 
software and hardware manufacturers since they 
should perform the appropriate changes to their 
products. Since the cryptographic algorithms should be 
implemented on the cellular phones, the agreement of 
mobile phone manufacturers is also required. 
However, a lonely upgrading of the deployed 
cryptographic algorithms cannot be so useful. Even 
though the ciphering algorithms are replaced with the 
strongest ones, the attacker can simply impersonate the 
real network and force MS to deactivate the ciphering 
mode so it is also necessary to modify the 
authentication protocols.  
 
3) Securing the backbone traffic: Encrypting the 
backbone traffic between the network components can 
prevent the attacker to eavesdrop or modify the 
transmitted data. Although this solution may be 
implemented without the blessings of GSM 
consortium, the cooperation of hardware 
manufacturers is still required. 
 
4) End-to-end Security: The best, easiest, and most 
profitable solution is to deploy the end-to-end security 
or security at the application layer. Most of GSM 
security vulnerabilities (except SIM cloning and DoS 
attacks) do not aim ordinary people, and their targets 
are usually restricted to special groups so it is 
reasonable and economical that such groups make their 
communications secure by the end-to-end security. 
Since the encryption and security establishment is 
performed at the end-entities, any change to the GSM 
hardware will not be required. In this way, even if the 
conversation is eavesdropped by the police or legal 
organizations, they cannot decrypt the transmitted data 
without having the true ciphering key, provided that a 
secure enough cryptographic algorithm is deployed. 
Therefore, in order to avoid illegal activities, it should 
be transparent to both GSM operator and service 
provider. It may also be necessary to find solutions for 
a legal interception or a key screw scheme. The end-to-
end security establishment has a complete flexibility to 
the deployed algorithms so the appropriate upgrades 
can be easily accomplished when necessary. However, 
it may be a subject to export control. Generally, the 
end-to-end security can be provided in the cellular 
systems by following one or some of the following 
approaches: 
1) Exploiting the processing capabilities of mobile 
phone using the programming languages such as 
J2ME (Java 2 Mobile Edition): Supported by the most 
recent cellular phones and Personal Digital Assistants 
(PDA) with the improved processing capabilities. 
2) Exploiting the processing capabilities of the SIM 
using the SIM Application Toolkit (SAT) [14]: Not 
supported by all SIM cards; especial SIM cards are 
required; the processing resources are still limited; and 
operations may be so time-consuming. 
3) Exploiting the processing capabilities of an 
additional smart card, e.g. JavaCard: Not supported 
by the usual phones; requires costly dual slot cellular 
phones. 
4) Exploiting the processing capabilities of a portable 
PC (laptop) connected to the ME: suitable for security 
mechanisms with huge processing and memory 
requirements, e.g. real-time end-to-end secure voice 
communications over the GSM voice channel [15]. 
5) Exploiting the processing capabilities of a crypto-
processor that is embedded in the ME [16]: It should 
be accomplished by the mobile manufacturer; cannot 
be changed or manipulated by the user; and may be a 
subject to export control. 
 The first four approaches have an inherent 
advantage due to their capability of being simply 
manipulated by the end-entities. However, choosing 
the most profitable approach regards to some 
parameters such as required memory and processing 
resources of the corresponding application. For 
example, if the voice is to be end-to-end encrypted 
over the data channel, it can even be implemented by a 
software application that is installed on an advanced 
cellular phone. On the other hand, for encryption over 
the voice channel that is hard to be tracked and so 
attractive for the terrorist and illegal activities, the 
fourth approach may be suitable [15]. The end-to-end 
security can be established by both symmetric and 
asymmetric encryption. The asymmetric encryption is 
usually too slow to be used for the real-time 
applications and may be used for the key establishment 
of a symmetric encryption algorithm. The public keys 
are usually jointed with the certificates. The private 
keys and the certificates can be securely stored on 
either SIM card, an additional smart card (for the dual-
slot phones), or a secure hardware on the phone. There 
are also some proposals for the Wireless Public Key 
Infrastructure (WPKI). 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, the security of the GSM network is 
evaluated, and a complete and brief review of its 
security problems is presented. It is proved that the 
GSM network has many inherent security flaws that 
can be misused for fraudulent purposes or for 
deceiving users. Some practical solutions to improve 
the security of currently available 2G networks are also 
proposed. Some solutions include the security 
improvement of the infrastructure while the others tend 
to provide the end-to-end security. It is also deduced 
that the end-to-end security or the security at the 
application layer is the best and most profitable 
solution for the currently available 2G systems. 
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